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Abstract. In the last decade it became a common practice to formalise software
requirements to improve the clarity of users’ expectations. In this work we build
on the fact that functional requirements can be expressed in temporal logic and
we propose new sanity checking techniques that automatically detect flaws and
suggest improvements of given requirements. Specifically, we describe and ex-
perimentally evaluate approaches to consistency and redundancy checking that
identify all inconsistencies and pinpoint their exact source (the smallest incon-
sistent set). We further report on the experience obtained from employing the
consistency and redundancy checking in an industrial environment. To complete
the sanity checking we also describe a semi-automatic completeness evaluation
that can assess the coverage of user requirements and suggest missing properties
the user might have wanted to formulate. The usefulness of our completeness
evaluation is demonstrated in a case study of an aeroplane control system.
1 Introduction
The earliest stages of software development entail among others the activity of user
requirements elicitation. The importance of clear specification of the requirements in
the contract-based development process is apparent from the necessity of final-product
compliance verification. Yet the specification itself is rarely described formally. Never-
theless, the formal description is an essential requirement for any kind of comprehensive
verification. Recently, there have been tendencies to use the mathematical language of
temporal logics, e.g. the Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), to specify functional system re-
quirements. Restating requirements in a rigorous, formal way enables the requirement
engineers to scrutinise their insight into the problem and allows for a considerably more
thorough analysis of the final requirement documents [19].
Later in the development, when the requirements are given and a model is designed,
the formal verification tools can provide a proof of correctness of the system being de-
veloped with respect to formally written requirements. The model of the system or even
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the system itself can be checked using model checking [4,12] or theorem proving [7]
tools. If there are some requirements the system does not meet, the cause has to be
found and the development reverted. The longer it takes to discover an error in the de-
velopment, the more expensive the error is to mend. Consequently, errors made during
requirements specification are among the most expensive ones in the whole develop-
ment.
Model checking is particularly efficient in finding bugs in the design, however, it
exhibits some shortcomings when it is applied to requirement analysis. In particular, if
the system satisfies the formula then the model checking procedure only provides an
affirmative answer and does not elaborate for the reason of the satisfaction. It could
be the case that, e.g. the specified formula is a tautology, hence, it is satisfied for any
system. Tautologies can be obvious, such as p∨¬p or subtle, such as pU¬(r ∧ q),
where r stands for “The value of variable x is smaller than 5” and q stands for “The
value of variable x is greater than 10”. To mitigate the situation a subsidiary approach,
the sanity checking, was proposed to check vacuity and coverage of requirements [22].
Yet the existence of a model is still a prerequisite which postpones the verification until
later phases in the development cycle.
The primary interest of this paper is to re-state and extend techniques of our own [2]
that allow the developers of computer systems to check sanity of their requirements
when it matters most, i.e. during the requirements stage. Sanity checking commonly
consists of three parts: consistency checking, redundancy checking, and checking com-
pleteness of requirements. A consistent set of requirements is one that can be imple-
mented in a single system. A vacuous requirement is satisfied trivially by a given system
and redundancy is the equivalent of vacuity for the model-free case. Finally, a complete
set of requirements extends to all sensible behaviours of a system. All three notions will
be defined properly in Section 2.
In our previous work we redefined the notion of sanity checking of requirements
written as LTL formulae and described its implementation and evaluation. The novelty
of our approach we recapitulate and extend in this paper lies in the idea of liberating
sanity checking from the necessity of having a model of the system under development.
Our approach to consistency and vacuity checking presented before identified all incon-
sistent and vacuous subsets of the input set of requirements. This considerably simpli-
fied the work of requirement engineers because it allowed to pinpoint all the sources
of inconsistencies. As for completeness checking, we proposed a new behaviour-based
coverage metric. Assuming that the user specifies what behaviour of the system is sen-
sible, our coverage metric calculated what portion of this behaviour is described by
the requirements specifying the system itself. The method further suggested new re-
quirements to the user that would have improved the coverage and thus ensured more
accurate description of users’ expectations.
Contribution The novelty of our consistency (redundancy) checking is that they pro-
duce all inconsistent (redundant) sets instead of a yes/no answer and their efficiency is
demonstrated in an experimental evaluation. Finally, the completeness checking presents
a new behaviour-based coverage and suggests formulae that would improve the cover-
age and, consequently, the rigour of the final requirements.
In this paper we extend [2] with a modified workflow that allows requirement engi-
neers to explicitly specify universal (∀) and existential (∃) nature of individual require-
ments allowing thus to more naturally express some of the system properties. We also
evaluate the robustness and sensitivity of our consistency and completeness checking
procedures with respect to the use of different LTL to BA translators. Furthermore, we
adopt vacuity checking for individual LTL formulae into the framework and add proper
references to relevant previous work. Finally, we report on experience we gathered in
cooperation with Honeywell International when applying our methodology on some
real-life industrial use cases.
1.1 Related Work
The use of model checking with properties (specified in CTL) derived from real-life
avionics software specifications was successfully demonstrated in [9]. This paper in-
tends to present a preliminary to such a use of a model checking tool, because there the
authors presupposed sanity of their formulae. The idea of using coverage as a metric
for completeness can be traced back to software testing, where it is possible to use LTL
requirements as one of the coverage metrics [34,28].
Model-based sanity checking was studied thoroughly and using various approaches,
but it is intrinsically different from model-free checking presented in this paper. Com-
pleteness is measured using metrics based on the state space coverage of the underlying
model [10,11]. Vacuity of temporal formulae was identified as a problem related to
model checking and solutions were proposed in [23] and in [22], again expecting exis-
tence of a model.
Checking consistency (or satisfiability) of temporal formulae is a well understood
problem solved using various techniques in many papers (most recently using SAT-
based approach in [30] or in [31] where it was used as a comparison between different
LTL to Bu¨chi translation techniques). The classical problem is formulated as to decide
whether a set of formulae is internally consistent. In this paper, however, a more elab-
orate answer is sought: specifically which of the formulae cause the inconsistency. The
approach is then extended to vacuity which is rarely used in model-free sanity checking.
We have adopted the idea of searching for the smallest inconsistent subset of a set
of requirements from the SAT community, where finding the minimal unsatisfiable core
(a set of propositional clauses) is an important feature of SAT solvers, see e.g. [26]. The
authors of [25] extend the approach to finding all minimal unsatisfiable subsets, again
in the context of propositional logic. Their exclusion of checking those subsets contain-
ing known unsatisfiable subsets was extended by our algorithm with a dual heuristic:
exclude also subsets with known satisfiable supersets.
A problem related to consistency is that of realisability [1]. Realisability generalises
consistency by allowing some of the atomic propositions to be controlled by the envi-
ronment. A set of system requirements is then realisable if there is a strategy which can
react to arbitrary environment choices while satisfying the requirements. If no proposi-
tions are controlled by the environment then the notion of realisability becomes equiva-
lent to consistency. A number of tools implement realisability, RATSY [6] for example,
but again limit their responses to stating whether the requirements are realisable as a
whole. Thus, even though the theory of minimal unrealisable cores had been known for
some time [13,21], searching for smallest inconsistent subsets is a feature unique for
our tool. We would also like to point out the theory described in [32] which extends
the unrealisability cores to search even within individual formulae, providing even finer
information on the quality of requirements.
Completeness of formal requirements is not as well-established and its definition
often differs. The most thorough research in algorithmic evaluation of completeness
was conducted in [18,24,27]. Authors of those papers use RSML (Requirements State
Machine Language) to specify requirements which they translate (in the last paper) to
CTL and to a theorem prover language to discover inconsistencies and detect incom-
pleteness. Their notion of completeness is based on verifying that for every input value
there is a reaction described in the specification. This paper presents completeness as
considering all behaviours described as sensible (and either refuting or requiring them).
Finally, a novel semi-formal methodology is proposed in this paper, that recommends
new requirements to the user, that have the potential to improve completeness of the
input specification.
Another approach at defining and checking completeness was pursued in [20] in
terms of evaluating the extend to which an implementation describes the intended spec-
ification. Their evaluation is based on the simulation preorder and searching for unim-
plemented transition/state evidence. In order to create a metric that would drive the
engine for generating new requirements we have build an evaluation algorithm that enu-
merates the similarity of two paths. Our notion of similarity is to certain extend based
on unimplemented transitions, but we carry the enumeration from two transition up to
the whole automata, thus finally obtaining our completeness metric. The authors of [8]
elaborate a method for measuring the quality of a set of requirements by detecting the
presence of such a subsets, that together require behaviour that could not be detected by
individual requirements. Similarly as in [18], the interesting behaviour is described in
terms of reactions to input values observed at discrete time instances, yet the properties
are limited to those of the form ∀t,At(t) =⇒ Zt(t).
Finally, the notion of coverage is well-established in the area of software testing.
The similarity with our work and that described for example in [29,17] lies in that both
approaches attempt to generate a description of sets of behaviours that remain uncov-
ered. The dissimilarity lies in that we describe these uncovered sets in term of software
requirements (or LTL formulae), whereas automated testing coverage produces collec-
tions of test, i.e. individual runs of a particular system.
2 Preliminaries
This section serves as a motivation for and a reminder of the model checking process
and its connection to sanity checking. A knowledgeable reader might find it slow-paced
and cursory, but its primary function is to justify the use of formal specifications and,
as such, requires more compliant approach.
2.1 LTL Model Checking
Definition 1 Let AP be the set of atomic propositions. Then the recursive definition
below specifies all well-formed LTL formulae over AP, where p ∈ AP:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ∧ϕ | X ϕ | ϕUϕ
Example 1. There are some well-established syntactic simplifications of the LTL lan-
guage, e.g. false := p∧¬p, true := ¬false, ϕ⇒ ψ := ¬(ϕ∧¬ψ), F ϕ := trueUϕ,
G ϕ := ¬(F ¬ϕ). Assuming that AP = {α := (c = 5),β := (a 6= b)}, these are exam-
ples of well-formed LTL formulae: G β,αU¬β. 4
In classical model checking one usually verifies that a model of the system in ques-
tion satisfies the given set of LTL-specified requirements. That is not possible in the
context of this paper because in the requirements stage there is no model to work with.
Nevertheless, to better understand the background of LTL model checking let us assume
that the system is modelled as a Labelled Transition System (LTS).
Definition 2 Let Σ be a set of state labels (it will mostly hold that Σ = AP). Then an
LTS M = (S,→,ν,S0) is a tuple, where: S is a set of states, →⊆ S× S is a transition
relation, ν : S→ 2Σ is a valuation function and S0 ⊆ S is a nonempty set of initial states.
A function r :N→ S is an infinite run over the states of M if r(0)∈ S0,∀i : r(i)→ r(i+1).
The trace or word of a run is a function w : N→ 2Σ, where w(i) = ν(r(i)).
An LTL formula states a property pertaining to an infinite trace (a trace that does
not have to be associated with a run). Assuming an LTS to be a model of a computer
program then a trace represents one specific execution of the program. Also the infinite-
ness of the executions is not necessarily an error – programs such as operating systems
or controlling protocols are not supposed to terminate.
Definition 3 Let w be an infinite word and let ϕ be an LTL formula over Σ. Then it is
possible to decide if w satisfies ϕ, w |= ϕ, based on the following rules:
w |= p iff p ∈ w(0),
w |= ¬ϕ iff w 6|= ϕ,
w |= ϕ1∧ϕ2 iff w |= ϕ1 and w |= ϕ2,
w |= X ϕ iff w1 |= ϕ,
w |= ϕ1Uϕ2 iff ∃i.∀ j < i : w j |= ϕ1,wi |= ϕ2,
where w(i) is the i-th letter of w and wi is the i-th suffix of w.
Example 2. Figure 1 contains LTS for a process engaged in Peterson’s mutual exclusion
protocol. The protocol can control access to the critical section (state CS) for arbitrarily
many processes that communicate using global variables to determine which process
will be granted access next. The two LTL formulae verify the liveness property of the
protocol:
1: If a process waits for an access to the critical section it will eventually get there.
2: A process outside the critical section will eventually get inside, and this hold in any
state of the system. 4
Traditionally, a system as a whole is considered to satisfy an LTL formula if all its
executions (all infinite words over the states of its LTS) do. However, we might occa-
sionally be also interested in the question whether at least one of a system’s executions
CS
NCS
wait
q3
q2
1 : G(wait⇒ F CS)
2 : G(¬CS⇒ F CS)
Fig. 1: LTS for Peterson’s mutual exclusion protocol (with only one process) and two
liveness LTL formulae.
satisfies the given LTL formula. We thus suggest explicit path quantification using the ∀
and ∃ quantifiers as follows: For a system model M and a formula ϕ, we write M |= ∀ϕ
if all executions of M satisfy ϕ, and M |= ∃ϕ if there is at least one execution of M sat-
isfying ϕ. We call the former kind of path-quantified formulae universal and the latter
kind existential.
There are several notes to be made. First, we do not allow for nesting of path-
quantified formulae as we want to avoid the complexity of dealing with full CTL∗. We
only occasionally use the negation operator with the meaning ¬∀ϕ ≡ ∃¬ϕ and vice
versa. Second, one of the advantages of making the hidden universal quantification of
LTL more explicit is to reduce the confusion over the fact that LTL seemingly does not
follow the law of excluded middle: We can have a system model that satisfies neither
ϕ nor ¬ϕ. Third, using path-quantified LTL formulae is really just a convenience, as
it does not make the verification task any harder. Indeed, to verify whether a system
model satisfies ∃ϕ is the same as to verify whether the system model satisfies ∀¬ϕ and
invert the answer. Efficient verification of that satisfaction, however, requires a more
systematic approach than enumeration of all executions. An example of a successful
approach is the enumerative approach using Bu¨chi automata.
Definition 4 A Bu¨chi automaton is a pair A = (M,F), where M is an LTS and F ⊆ S.
An automaton A accepts an infinite word w (w ∈ L(A)) if there exists a run r for w in M
and there is a state from F that appears infinitely often on r, i.e. ∀i∃ j > i : r( j) ∈ F.
Arbitrary LTL formula ϕ can be transformed into a Bu¨chi automaton Aϕ such that
w |= ϕ⇔ w ∈ L(Aϕ). Also checking that every execution satisfies ϕ is equivalent to
checking that no execution satisfies ¬ϕ. It only remains to combine the LTS model of
the given system M with A¬ϕ in such a way that the resulting automaton will accept
exactly those words of M that violate ϕ. Finally, deciding existence of such a word –
and by extension verifying correctness of the system – has been shown equivalent to
finding accepting cycle in a graph.
In the following sections we shall usually deal with the standard approach to LTL
first, i.e. consider implicit universal path quantification of the formulae. We then follow
with the extension to existential path-quantified formulae.
2.2 Model-based Sanity Checking
As described in the introduction the model checking procedure is not designed to decide
why was a certain property satisfied in a given system. That is a problem, however,
because the reasons for satisfaction might be the wrong ones. If for example the system
is modelled erroneously or the formula is not appropriate for the system then it is still
possible to receive a positive answer.
These kinds of inconsistencies between the model and the formula are detected
using sanity checking techniques, namely vacuity and coverage. In this paper they will
be described for comparison with their model-free versions; interested reader should
consult for example [22] for more details.
Let K be an LTS, ϕ a formula and ψ its subformula. Let further ϕ[ψ′/ψ] be the
modified formula ϕ in which its subformula ψ is substituted by ψ′. Then ψ does not
affect the truth value of ϕ in K if the following property holds: K satisfies ϕ[ψ′/ψ] for
every formula ψ′ iff K satisfies ϕ. Then a system K satisfies a formula ϕ vacuously if K
satisfies ϕ and there is a subformula ψ of ϕ such that ψ does not affect ϕ in K.
A state s of an LTS K is q-covered by ϕ, for a formula ϕ and an atomic proposition
q, if K satisfies ϕ but K˜s,q does not satisfy ϕ. There K˜s,q stands for an LTS equivalent to
K except the valuation of q in the state s is flipped.
If one could extract the underlying ideas of vacuity and coverage and show that they
do not necessarily require the existence of a model, it would be possible to extrapolate
these notions into the model-free environment. Vacuity states that the satisfaction of
a formula is given extrinsically (by an environment) and is not related to the formula
itself. Thus we may consider the remaining formulae from the set of requirements to
constitute the environment. Coverage, on the other hand, attempts to capture the amount
of system behaviour that is described by the formulae. Again, we can use the remaining
formulae to form the system, but in order to establish a coverage metric capable of
differentiating various formulae, we will need to extend the notion from state-coverage
to path-coverage.
Although these notions of sanity are dependent on the system that is being veri-
fied, we might still utilise at least the notion of vacuity in a model-less setting, using
a concept of vacuity witnesses. A vacuity witness to a given formula ϕ is a formula
ψ with the following property: If a system K satisfies ψ then it satisfies ϕ vacuously.
A standard example is the request-response formula G(req⇒ F resp) “every request
is followed by a response”, whose two vacuity witnesses are G(¬req) “no request ever
happens” and G F (resp) “responses happen infinitely often”. The vacuity witnesses for
a given formula can be automatically generated, see [5]. Moreover, as it is desired for
the vacuity witnesses not to hold, we may include this requirement in our original set of
requirements with the help of path-quantified LTL formulae. For example, if our set of
requirements contains the formula ∀G(req⇒ F resp), we add the formulae ∃F (req)
and ∃F G(¬resp) to the set – those are the negations of the vacuity witnesses.
In the rest of this paper, we translate the concepts of model-based sanity into model-
free environment. However, to avoid confusion, we use the word redundancy instead of
model-less vacuity.1 We further supplement these notions with consistency verification
thus arriving at a method that would aid the creation of a reasonable set of requirements,
i.e. a set such that it is reasonable to ask if a system satisfies it or not. If, however, the
intention is to build a system based on this set, then a further property of such set would
1 This is in contrast to the original paper [2] where redundancy has been called vacuity as the
paper did not include vacuity witnesses.
be desirable and that the set completely describes the system under development. Con-
sequently, a sane set of requirements is consistent, without redundancies, and complete
in a sense we will formalise in Section 4.
3 Checking Consistency and Redundancy
As various studies concluded, undetected errors made early in the development cycle
are the most expensive to eradicate. Thus it is very important that the outcome of the
requirements stage – a database of well-formed, traceable requirements – is what the
customer intended and that nothing was omitted (not even unintentionally). While a
procedure that would ensure the two properties cannot be automated, this paper pro-
poses a methodology to check the sanity of requirements. In the following the sanity
checking will be considered to consist of 3 related tasks: consistency, redundancy and
completeness checking. As consistency and redundancy are more closely related, we
focus on them in this section and dedicate the following section solely to completeness.
Definition 5 A set Γ of LTL formulae over AP is consistent if ∃w ∈ APω : w satisfies∧
Γ. Checking consistency of a set Γ entails finding all minimal inconsistent subsets of
Γ. A formula ϕ is redundant with respect to a set of formulae Γ if
∧
Γ⇒ ϕ. To check
redundancy of a set Γ entails finding all pairs of 〈ϕ∈Γ,Φ⊆Γ〉 such thatΦ is consistent
and Φ⇒ ϕ (and for no Φ′ ⊆Φ does it hold that Φ′⇒ ϕ).
The existence of the appropriate w can be tested by constructing A∧Γ and checking
that L(A∧Γ) is non-empty. The procedure is effectively equivalent to model checking
where the model is a clique over the graph with one vertex for every element of 2AP
(allowing every possible behaviour).
This approach to consistency and redundancy is especially efficient if a non-trivial
set of requirements needs to be processed and standard sanity checking would only
reveal if there is an inconsistency (or redundancy) but would not be able to locate the
source. Furthermore, dealing with larger sets of requirements entails the possibility that
there will be several inconsistent subsets or that a formula is redundant due to multiple
small subsets. Each of these conflicting subsets needs to be considered separately which
can be facilitated using the methodology proposed in this paper.
Example 3. Let us assume that there are five requirements formalised as LTL formulae
over a set of atomic propositions (two-valued signals) {p,q,a}. They are
1. Eventually, the presence of signal p will entail its continued presence until the
signal q is observed. ϕ1 = F (p⇒ pU q)
2. The signal p will occur infinitely often. ϕ2 = G F p
3. The signals a and p cannot occur at the same time. ϕ3 = G ¬(a∧ p)
4. Each occurrence of the signal q requires that signal a was observed in the previous
time step. ϕ4 = G(X q⇒ a)
5. The signal q will occur infinitely often. ϕ5 = G F q
In this set the formula ϕ4 is inconsistent due to the first 3 formulae and the last formula
is redundant with respect to (implied by) the first 2 formulae. 4
We now reformulate the notions of Definition 5 to extend also to path-quantified
LTL formulae. Again, we are interested in finding the minimal inconsistent subsets and
minimal redundancy witnesses.
Definition 6 A set Γ of path-quantified LTL formulae over AP is consistent if there
is a system model M such that M |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ Γ. A path-quantified formula ϕ is
redundant with respect to a set of formulae Γ if every model M satisfying all formulae
of Γ also satisfies ϕ.
We now show that checking consistency and redundancy in the path-quantified set-
ting can be easily reduced to the case in the standard setting. Let us partition the set
Γ into existential formulae ∃Γ and universal formulae ∀Γ, i.e. ∃Γ := Γ∩{∃ϕ}, for ϕ
quantifier-free, and ∀Γ := Γ\∃Γ. Further, let Ψ1∃ := {Φ∪{ϕ} |Φ⊆ ∀Γ,ϕ ∈ ∃Γ}.
Theorem 1. In order to locate all smallest inconsistent subsets of Γ is suffices to search
amongΨ1∃. Similarly, checking redundancy may correctly be limited to checking among
pairs
〈ϕ ∈ Γ,Φ⊆ ∀Γ〉 ϕ universal
〈∀ψ,Φ ∈Ψ1∃∪∀Γ〉 ϕ existential,ϕ= ∃ψ.
Proof. Let us first consider consistency. Clearly, if Γ only consists of universal for-
mulae, we may simply ignore their quantifiers. In the case of Γ containing existential
formulae, we can make the following two observations:
– First observation: Two existential formulae are always consistent provided that they
are both self-consistent, i.e. none of them is equal to false. This can be easily seen
as we can always provide a model with exactly two paths, each satisfying one of the
formulae. This observations tells us that every minimal inconsistent subset contains
at most one existential formula.
– Second observation: Let us write Γ∀ to denote the set Γ in which all path quantifiers
have been changed to ∀. If the set Γ contains at most one existential formula then
the following holds: Γ is consistent iff Γ∀ is consistent. One direction is obvious,
the other follows from the fact that we can always provide a single-path model as
a proof of consistency of Γ∀.
The result of the two observations is that if we are careful to never consider sets with
more than one existential formula, we may freely ignore the path-quantifiers.
Let us now consider redundancy. It is clear that the following holds: ϕ is redundant
with respect to Γ iff Γ∪{¬ϕ} is inconsistent. This means that redundancy checking is
easily reduced to consistency checking. This fact holds in the path-quantified setting
as well as in the standard one and will be used later in the implementation. Note that
the first observation above has the following consequences: If ϕ is a universal formula,
then it makes sense to consider Γ with universal formulae only, as ¬ϕ is existential.
Furthermore, if ϕ is an existential formula, it makes sense to consider Γ containing at
most one existential formula. uunionsq
From the above theorem it follows that all formulae that require consideration are
universal, which is the implicit quantifier of quantifier-free formulae. In other words
the two statements above enable the same algorithms for checking sanity, described
in the next section, to be used in the path-quantified setting as well. Yet the validity
of the two statements requires a more detailed argumentation. Before we come to the
implementation, let us illustrate the interplay between the concepts discussed so far
(model-less consistency, redundancy, and vacuity witnesses) on a more comprehensive
example.
Example 4. Consider a set of requirements containing just two items:
1. If a signal a is ever activated, it will remain active indefinitely, i.e. in every time step
it holds that if a is active now it will also be active in the next time step. Translating
this natural language requirement to LTL we arrive at: ϕ1 = G(a⇒ X a)
2. If a signal a is ever activated, it will not be active in the next time step, i.e. a must
never hold in two successive steps. After translation the appropriate LTL formula
thus stands: ϕ2 = G(a⇒ X ¬a)
Note that although such requirements might seem inconsistent at first glance, they are,
in fact, consistent as any consistency checking algorithm could demonstrate. What the
following redundancy analysis is about to reveal is that, while consistent, it is not rea-
sonable to require both formulae to hold at the same time.
Let us elaborate and formalise the reasoning step of redundancy checking. We be-
gin by constructing the vacuity witnesses according to the method in [5]. The vacuity
witnesses for ϕ1 are: G(¬a), G X a. The first witness is quite intuitive, if the signal a
is never activated in a system then requiring ϕ1 to hold is unreasonable. Similarly, if at
every time step we have that a will be active in the next step then clearly the presence of
a in this time step is irrelevant. Exactly the same kind of mechanisable reasoning leads
to the vacuity witnesses for ϕ2: G(¬a), G X (¬a). We thus create the new requirements
as described in the previous section. The set of requirements now contains ∀ϕ1, ∀ϕ2,
∃F a, ∃F X (¬a), ∃F X a. Take for example ∃F X (¬a), resulting from the negated
witness G X a. Being existentially quantified, this requirement demands the existence
of at least one computation of the system, one on which a state whose successor does
not observe a will eventually occur. Note that we have converted the implicit formulae
into universal ones and ignored the duplicity of the vacuity witnesses.
We now check the redundancy of the requirements and discover that the formula
∃F X a implies ∃F a, we thus drop ∃F a from the set. The remaining four formulae are
checked for consistency. We find {∀ϕ1,∀ϕ2,∃F X a} as the only minimal inconsistent
subset. The conclusion is that although ϕ1 and ϕ2 are consistent, the only models that
satisfy both of them satisfy them redundantly. The two formulae can thus be said to be
redundantly consistent. 4
3.1 Implementation of Consistency Checking
Let us henceforth denote one specific instance of consistency (or redundancy) checking
as a check. For consistency and a set Γ it means to check that for some γ ⊆ Γ is ∧γ
satisfiable. For redundancy it means for γ ⊆ Γ and ϕ ∈ Γ to check that ∧γ ⇒ ϕ is
satisfiable. In the worst case both consistency and redundancy checking would require
Algorithm 1: Consistency Check
1 while t← getTask() do
2 if t.checked() then
3 genSuccs(t)
4 else
5 t.checked← verCons(t)
6 updateSets(t)
7 Pool.enqueue(t)
Algorithm 2: genSuccs(Task t)
1 if t.con() then
2 if t.dir =↑ then
3 genSupsets(t)
4 else
5 if t.dir =↓ then
6 genSubsets.(t)
an exponential number of checks. However, the proposed algorithm considers previous
results and only performs the checks that need to be tested.
Both consistency and redundancy checking use three data structures that facilitate
the computation. First, there is the queue of verification tasks called Pool, then there
are two sets, Con and Incon, which store the consistent and inconsistent combinations
found so far. Finally, each individual task contains a set of integers (that uniquely identi-
fies formulae from Γ) and a flag value (containing three bits for three binary properties).
First, whether the satisfaction check was already performed or not. Second, if the com-
bination is consistent. And the third bit specifies the direction in subset relation (up or
down in the Hasse diagram) in which the algorithm will continue. The successors will
be either subsets or supersets of the current combination.
The idea behind consistency checking is very simple (listed as Algorithm 1). The
pool contains all the tasks to be performed and these tasks are of two types: either to
check consistency of the combination or to generate successors. The symmetry of the
solution allows for parallel processing (multiple threads performing the Algorithm 1 at
the same time) given that the data structures are properly protected from race conditions.
The pool needs to be initialised with all single element subsets of Γ and Γ itself, thus in
the subsequent iteration will be checked the supersets of the former and subsets of the
latter.
Algorithm 2 is called when the task t on the top of Pool is already checked. At this
point either all subsets or all supersets of t should be enqueued as tasks. But not all
successors need to be inspected, e.g. if t is consistent then also all its subsets will be
consistent – that is clearly true and no subset of t needs to be checked.
That observation is utilised again in Algorithm 3. It does not suffice to stop gener-
ating subsets and supersets when its immediate predecessors are found consistent (in-
consistent), because it can also happen that the combination to be checked was formed
in a different branch of the Hasse diagram of the subset relation. In order to prevent
redundant satisfiability checks two sets are maintained Con and Incon (see how these
are used on line 4 of Algorithm 3).
The actual consistency (and quite similarly also redundancy) checking is less com-
plicated (see Algorithm 4) and may even be delegated to a third party tool. First, the
conjunction of formulae encoded in the task is created. In our setting we then check
the appropriate Bu¨chi automaton for the existence of an accepting cycle: using nested
Algorithm 3: genSupsets(Task t)
1 foreach i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} do
2 t.add(i)
3 if ∀X ∈ Con : X 6⊇ t ∧
4 ∀X ∈ Incon : X 6⊆ t then
5 enqueue(t)
6 t.erase(i)
Algorithm 4: verCons(t=〈i1, . . . , i j〉)
1 F← createConj(ϕi1 , . . . ,ϕi j)
2 A← transform2BA(F)
3 return findAccCycle(A)
DFS [14]. Hence the Algorithm 4 can easily be substituted with another method for
checking consistency of a set of LTL formulae. A realisability checking tool, such as
RATSY, could also be applied: one only needs to state that all signals are controlled by
the system.
Extension to Redundancy Checking The only difference when performing the redun-
dancy checking is that the task t consists of a list 〈i1, . . . , i j〉 which can be empty, and
one index ik. Since the task is to decide whether ϕi1 ∧ . . .∧ϕi j ⇒ ϕik the line 1 needs to
be altered to:
F← createConj(ϕi1 , . . . ,ϕi j ,¬ϕik)
This is due to the fact discussed in the previous section, namely that the satisfiability of
ϕi1 ∧ . . .∧ϕi j ∧¬ϕik implies ϕi1 ∧ . . .∧ϕi j 6⇒ ϕik , i.e. ϕik is not redundant with respect
to {ϕi1 , . . . ,ϕi j}.
Discarding the Bu¨chi automata in every iteration may seem unnecessarily wasteful,
especially since synchronous composition of two (and more) automata is a feasible op-
eration. However, the size of an automaton created by composition is a multiplication
of the sizes of the automata being composed. Furthermore, it would not be possible to
use the size optimising techniques employed in LTL to Bu¨chi translation. And these
techniques work particularly well in our case, because the translated formulae (con-
junctions of requirements) have relatively small nesting depth (maximal depth among
requirements +1).
Example 5. We will demonstrate the search for smallest inconsistent subsets on the
following set of requirements.
1. A request to increase the cabin temperature a may always be issued and each such
request will eventually be granted by heating unit b. ϕ1 = G(F a∧ (a⇒ F b))
2. There is only a finite amount of fuel for the heating unit. ϕ2 = F G(¬b)
3. The system must be robust to handle overriding command c after which no request
to increase the temperature may be issued. ϕ3 = F (c∧ c⇒ G ¬a)
4. There will be no request to increase the temperature initially, but every heating will
be preceded by a request which must be turned off after one time unit once the
heating starts. Also the request is always issued until the heating starts.
a ϕ4 = G(aU b∧X b⇒ (a∧X a∧X X ¬a))∧¬a
Our consistency checking algorithm begins by checking in parallel the individual
requirements ϕ1, . . . ,ϕ4 for consistency and also the whole set Γ= {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕ4}. It dis-
covers that ϕ4 is inconsistent on its own and that Γ is also inconsistent. The fact that
ϕ4 is inconsistent is employed by not considering any of the sets containing ϕ4, i.e.
{ϕ1,ϕ4}, {ϕ2,ϕ4}, {ϕ3,ϕ4}, {ϕ1,ϕ2,ϕ4}, {ϕ1,ϕ3,ϕ4}, and {ϕ2,ϕ3,ϕ4}. Next, the al-
gorithm checks the supersets of the largest consistent sets, i.e. {ϕ1,ϕ2}, {ϕ1,ϕ3}, and
{ϕ2,ϕ3}. Discovering that both {ϕ1,ϕ2} and {ϕ1,ϕ3} are inconsistent it terminates
since {ϕ1,ϕ2,ϕ3} is necessarily also inconsistent. The smallest inconsistent subsets are
thus {ϕ4}, {ϕ1,ϕ2}, and {ϕ1,ϕ3}. 4
4 Checking Completeness
The completeness checking is a little more involved: this is in fact the part that provably
cannot be fully automated. Hence the paper will first describe the problem and then
detail the semi-automatic solution proposed.
Let us assume that the user specifies three types of requirements: environmental
assumptions ΓA, required behaviour ΓR and forbidden behaviour ΓF . The environmental
assumptions represent the sensible properties of the world a given system is to work in,
e.g. “The plane is either in the air or on the ground, but never in both these states at
once”, in LTL this would read G(ground⇔¬air). The required behaviour represents
the functional requirements imposed on the system: the system will not be correct if
any of these is not satisfied, e.g. “If the plane is ever to fly it must first be tested on the
ground”: F air ⇒ (ground ∧ tested). Dually, the forbidden behaviour contains those
patterns that the system must not display, e.g. “Once tested the plane should be put into
air within the next three time steps”: ¬ testedU(air∨X air∨X X air).
Assume henceforth the following simplifying notation for Bu¨chi automata: let f
be a propositional formula over capital Latin letters A,B, . . . barred letters A¯, B¯, . . . and
Greek letters α,β, . . ., where A substitutes
∧
γ∈ΓA γ, A¯ stands for
∨
γ∈ΓA γ and all Greek
letters represent simple LTL formulae. Then A f denotes such a Bu¨chi automaton that
accepts all words satisfying the substituted f , e.g. AA∨B¯∧ϕ accepts words satisfying∧
γ∈ΓA γ∨
∨
γ∈ΓB γ∧ϕ. The automaton AA thus describes the part of the state space the
user is interested in and which the required and forbidden behaviour should together
submerge. That most commonly is not the case with freshly elicited requirements and
therefore the problem is the following: find sufficiently simple formulae over AP that
would, together with formulae for R and F , cover a large portion of AA. In other words
to find such ϕ that AR∨F¯∨ϕ covers as much of AA as possible.
In order to evaluate the size of the part of AA covered by a single formula, i.e. how
much of the possible behaviour is described by it, an evaluation methodology for Bu¨chi
automata needs to be established. The plain enumeration of all possible words accepted
by an automaton is impractical given the fact that Bu¨chi automata operate over infinite
words. Similarly, the standard completeness metrics based on state coverage [11,33]
are unsuitable because they do not allow for comparison of sets of formulae and they
require the underlying model. Equally inappropriate is to inspect only the underlying
directed graph because Bu¨chi automata for different formulae may have isomorphic
underlying graphs.
The methodology proposed in this paper is based on the notion of almost-simple
paths and directed partial coverage function.
Definition 7 Let G be a directed graph. A path pi in G is a sequence of vertices v1, . . . ,vn
such that ∀i : (vi,vi+1) is an edge in G. A path is almost-simple if no vertex appears on
the path more than twice. The notion of almost-simplicity is also applicable to words in
the case of Bu¨chi automata.
With almost-simple paths one can enumerate the behavioural patterns of a Bu¨chi
automaton without having to handle infinite paths. Clearly, it is a heuristic approach
and a considerable amount of information will be lost but since all simple cycles will
be considered (and thus all patterns of the infinite behaviour) the resulting evaluation
should provide sufficient distinguishing capacity (as demonstrated in Section 5.2).
Knowing which paths are interesting it is possible to propose a methodology that
would allow comparing two paths. There is, however, a difference between Bu¨chi au-
tomata that represent a computer system and those built using only LTL formulae (ones
that should restrict the behaviour of the system). The latter automata use a different
evaluation function νˆ that assigns to every edge a set of literals. The reason behind this
is that the LTL-based automaton only allows those edges (in the system automaton) for
which their source vertex has an evaluation compatible with the edge evaluation (now
in the LTL automaton).
Definition 8 Let A1 and A2 be two (LTL) Bu¨chi automata over AP and let APL be the
set of literals over AP. The directed partial coverage function Λ assigns to every pair
of edge evaluations a rational number between 0 and 1, Λ : 2APL× 2APL → Q. The
evaluation works as follows
Λ(A1 = {l11, . . . , l1n},A2 = {l21, . . . , l2m}) =
{
0 ∃i, j : l1i ≡ ¬l2 j
p/m otherwise
where p = |A1∩A2|.
From this definition one can observe that Λ is not symmetric. This is intentional
because the goal is to evaluate how much a path in A2 covers a path in A1. Hence the
fact that there are some additional restricting literals on an edge of A1 does not prevent
automaton A2 to display the required behaviour (the one observed in A1).
The extension of coverage from edges to paths and to automata is based on aver-
aging over almost-simple paths. An almost-simple path pi2 of automaton A2 covers an
almost-simple path pi1 of automaton A1 by Λ(pi1,pi2) = ∑
n
i=0Λ(A1i,A2i)
n per cent, where n
is the number of edges and A ji is the set of labels on i-th edge on pi j. Then automa-
ton A2 covers A1 by Λ(A1,A2) = ∑
m
i=0 max2iΛ(pi1i,pi2i)
m per cent, where m is the number of
almost-simple paths of A1 that end in an accepting vertex. It follows that coverage of
100 per cent occurs when for every almost-simple path of one automaton there is an
almost-simple path in the other automaton that exhibits similar behaviour.
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Fig. 2: 1a) Example Bu¨chi automaton Aa; 1b) All almost-simple paths of Aa; 1c) and
1d) are two different Bu¨chi automata with relatively similar evaluations of almost-
simple paths (see Example 6).
4.1 Implementation of Completeness Checking
The high-level overview of the implementation of the proposed methodology is based
on partial coverage of almost-simple paths of AA. In other words finding the most suit-
able path in AR∨F¯∨ϕ for every almost-simple path in AA, where ϕ is a sensible simple
LTL formula that is proposed as a candidate for completion. Finally, the suitability will
be assessed as the average of partial coverage over all edges on the path.
The output of such a procedure will be a sequence of candidate formulae, each
associated with an estimated coverage (a number between 0 and 1) the addition of this
particular formula would entail. The candidate formulae are added in a sequence so
that the best unused formula is selected in every round. Finally, the coverage is always
related to AA and, thus, if some behaviour that cannot be observed in AA is added with
a candidate formula this addition will neither improve nor degrade the coverage.
Example 6. The method of Bu¨chi automata evaluation will be partially exemplified us-
ing Figure 2. The example only shows the enumeration of almost-simple paths and
the partial coverage of two paths. What remains to the complete methodology will be
shown more structurally in Algorithm 5. The enumeration of almost-simple paths of Aa
in Figure 1a) should be straightforward, part the fact that a path is represented as a se-
quence of edges for simplicity. Let us assume that Ab is the original automaton and Ac
is being evaluated for how thoroughly it covers Ab. There are 4 almost-simple paths in
Ab, one of them is pi= 〈a;¬a,b;c,a;a〉. The partial coverage between the first edge of pi
and the first edge of Ac (there is only one possibility) is 0.5, since there is the excessive
literal d. The coverage between the second edges is also 0.5, but only because of ¬c
in Ac; the superfluous literal ¬a restricts only the behaviour of Ab. Finally, the average
similarity between pi and the respective path in Ac is 0.75 and it is approximately 0.7
between the two automata. 4
The topmost level of the completeness evaluation methodology is shown as Algo-
rithm 5. As input this function requires the three sets of user defined requirements, the
set of candidate formulae and the number of formulae the algorithm needs to select. On
Algorithm 5: Completeness Evaluation
Input : ΓA, ΓR, ΓF , ΓCand , n
Output: Best coverage for 1 . . .n formulae from ΓCand
1 γAssum←∧γ∈ΓA γ
2 γDesc←∧γ∈ΓR γ∨∨γ∈ΓF γ
3 A← transform2BA(γAssum)
4 pathsBA← enumeratePaths(A)
5 for i = 1 . . .n do
6 max← ∞
7 foreach γ ∈ ΓCand do
8 γTest ← γDesc∨ γ
9 A← transform2BA(γTest)
10 cur← avrPathCov(A,pathsBA)
11 if max< cur then
12 max← cur
13 γMax← γ
14 print( “Best coverage in i-th round is max.” )
15 γDesc← γDesc∨ γMax
16 ΓCand ← ΓCand \{γMax}
lines 1 and 2 the formulae for conjunction of assumptions and user requirements (both
required and forbidden) are created. They will be used later to form larger formulae
to be translated into Bu¨chi automata and evaluated for completeness but, for now, they
need to be kept separate. Next step is to enumerate the almost-simple paths of AA for
later comparison, i.e. a baseline state space that the formulae from ΓCand should cover.
The rest of the algorithm forms a cycle that iteratively evaluates all candidates from
ΓCand (see line 8 where the corresponding formula is being formed). Among the candi-
date formulae the one with the best coverage of the paths is selected and subsequently
added to the covering system.
Functions enumeratePaths and avrPathCov are similar extensions of the BFS
algorithms. Unlike BFS, however, they do not keep the set of visited vertices to allow
state revisiting (twice in case of enumeratePaths and arbitrary number of times in case
of avrPathCov). The avrPathCov search is executed once for every path it receives as
input and stops after inspecting all paths to the length of the input path or if the current
search path is incompatible (see Definition 8).
5 Experimental Evaluation
All three sanity checking algorithms were implemented as an extension of the parallel
explicit-state LTL model checker DiVinE [4]. From the many facilities offered by this
tool, only the LTL to Bu¨chi translation was used. Similarly as the original tool also this
extension to sanity checking was implemented using parallel computation.
5.1 Experiments with Random Formulae
The first set of experiments was conducted on randomly generated LTL formulae. The
motivation behind using random formulae is to demonstrate the reduction in the number
of consistency checks. A naive algorithm for detecting inconsistent/redundant subsets
requires an exponential number of such checks. Generating a large number of require-
ment collections with varying relations among individual requirements allows a more
representative results than a few, real-world collections.
In order for the experiments to be as realistic as possible (avoiding trivial or ex-
ceedingly complex formulae) requirements with various nesting depths were generated.
Nesting depth denotes the depth of the syntactic tree of a formula. Statistics about the
most common formulae show, e.g. in [16], that the nesting is rarely higher than 5 and
is 3 on average. Following these observations, the generating algorithm takes as input
the desired number n of formulae and produces: n/10 formulae of nesting 5, 9n/60 of
nesting 1, n/6 of nesting 4, n/4 of nesting 2 and n/3 of nesting 3. Finally, the number of
atomic propositions is also chosen according to n (it is n/3) so that the formulae would
all contribute to the same state space.
All experiments were run on a dedicated Linux workstation with quad core Intel
Xeon 5130 @ 2GHz and 16GB RAM. The codes were compiled with optimisation op-
tions -O2 using GCC version 4.3.2. Since the running times and even the number of
checks needed for completion of all proposed algorithms differ for every set of formu-
lae, the experiments were ran multiple times. The sensible number of formulae starts
at 8: for less formulae the running time is negligible. Experimental tests for consis-
tency and redundancy were executed for up to 15 formulae and for each number the
experiment was repeated 25 times.
Figure 3 summarises the running times for consistency checking experiments. For
every set of experiments (on the same number of formulae) there is one box capturing
median, extremes and the quartiles for that set of experiments. From the figure it is
clear that despite the optimisation techniques employed in the algorithm both median
and maximal running times increase exponentially with the number of formulae. On
the other hand there are some cases for which presented optimisations prevented the
exponential blow-up as is observable from the minimal running times.
Figure 4 illustrates the discrepancy between the number of combinations of formu-
lae and the number of redundancy checks that were actually performed. The number of
combinations for n formulae is n∗2n−1 but the optimisation often led to much smaller
number. As one can see from the experiments on 9 formulae, it is potentially necessary
to check almost all the combinations but the method proposed in this paper requires on
average less than 10 per cent of the checks and the relative number decreases with the
number of formulae.
The actual running times, as reported in Figure 3, depend crucially on the chosen
method for consistency checking: automata-based Algorithm 4 in our case. Our algo-
rithm for enumerating all smallest inconsistent subsets is robust with respect to the con-
sistency checking algorithm used. Hence any other consistency (or realisability) tool
could be used, but that would only affect the actual running times, but not the number
of checks, reported in Figure 4.
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Fig. 3: Log-plot summarising the time complexity of consistency checking.
5.2 Case Study: Aeroplane Control System
In order to demonstrate the full potential of the proposed sanity checking, we apply all
the steps in a sequence. First, the whole requirements document is checked for consis-
tency and redundancy and only the consistent and non-redundant subset is then eval-
uated with respect to its completeness. A sensible exposition of the effectiveness of
completeness evaluation proposed in this paper requires more elaborate approach than
using random formulae as the input requirements document.
For that purpose a case study has been devised that demonstrates the capacity to
assess coverage of requirements and to recommend suitable coverage-improving LTL
formulae. The requirements document was written by a requirements engineer whose
task was to evaluate to method, and we only use random formulae as candidates for
coverage improvement. The candidate formulae were built based on the atomic propo-
sition that appeared in the input requirements and only very simple generated formulae
were selected. It was also required that the candidates do not form an inconsistent or
tautological set. Alternatively, pattern-based [16] formulae could be used as candidates.
The methodology is general enough to allow semi-random candidates generated using
patterns from input formulae. For example if an implication is used as the input formula,
the antecedent may not be required by the other formulae which may not be according
to user’s expectations.
The case study attempts to propose a system of LTL formulae that should control
the flight and more specifically the landing of an aeroplane. The LTL formulae and the
atomic propositions they use are summarised in Figure 5. The requirements are divided
into 3 categories similarly as in the text: A requirements represent assumptions and R
and F stand for required and forbidden behaviour, respectively. The grayed formulae
were found either redundant or inconsistent and were not included in the completeness
evaluation.
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Fig. 4: Log-plot with the relative number of checks for redundancy checking.
A1 The plane is on the ground only if its speed is less or equal to 200 mph.
A2 The plane will eventually land and every landing will result in the plane being on
the ground.
A3 If the plane is not landing its speed is above 200 mph.
A4 Whenever the undercarriage is down, first the speed must be at most 100 mph and
second the plane must eventually land on the ground.
A5 Whenever the plane is not landing its height above ground is not zero.
A6 At any time during the flight it holds that either the plane if flying faster than 200
mph or it eventually touches the ground.
R1 The landing process entails that eventually: (1) the speed will remain below 200
mph indefinitely and (2) after some finite time the speed will also remain below
100 mph.
R2 The landing process also entails that the plane should eventually slow down from
200 mph to 100 mph (during which the speed never goes above 200 mph).
R3 Whenever flying faster than 200 mph, the undercarriage must be retracted.
R4 At some point in the future, the plane should commence landing, then detract the
undercarriage until finally the speed is below 100 mph.
R5 In the future the plane will be decommissioned: it will land and then either never
flying faster than 100 mph or always slowing down below 200 mph.
R6 At some point in the future, the speed will be below 200 mph and the undercarriage
retracted. Immediately before that and while the speed is still above 200 mph the
undercarriage is detracted in two consecutive steps.
F1 The plane will eventually be on the ground after which it will never take off again.
Atomic Propositions
a ≡ [height = 0]
b ≡ [speed≤ 200]
l ≡ [landing]
u ≡ [undercarriage]
c ≡ [speed≤ 100]
LTL Requirements
A1 : G(a⇔ b) R1 : G(l⇒ F (G b∧F G c))
A2 : F l∧G(l⇒ F a) R2 : G(l⇒ F (bU c))
A3 : G(¬l⇒¬b) R3 : G(¬b⇒¬u)
A4 : G(u⇒ F a∧u⇒ c) R4 : F (lU(uU c))
A5′ : G(¬l⇒¬a) R5′ : F (l∧G(¬c∨F (¬b)))
A6′ : G(¬b∨F a) R6′ : F (¬b∧¬u∧X (¬b∧u)∧X X (b∧u))
F1 : F (a∧G(¬a))
Fig. 5: The two tables explain the shorthands for atomic propositions and list the LTL
requirements.
Consistency The three categories of requirements are checked for consistency and re-
dundancy separately. The environmental assumptions form a consistent set. The set of
required behaviour contained two smallest inconsistent subsets. The requirement R4
is inconsistent with R6, hence we have choose R4 as more important and exclude R6
from the collection. The second inconsistent subset was: R1, R2, R5. There we chose
to preserve R1 and R2, leaving out the possibility to decommission a plane.
Redundancy After regaining consistency of the required behaviour, our sanity checking
procedure detects no redundancy in this set. On the other hand there are two redundant
environmental assumptions. The assumption A5 is implied by the conjunction of A1
and A3 and is thus redundant. It also holds that any environment in which A2 and A3
are true also satisfies A6. Hence both A5 and A6 can be removed without changing the
set of sensible behaviour in the environment.
Completeness Initially, the remaining required and forbidden behaviour together does
not cover the environment assumptions at all, i.e. the coverage is 0. There simply are
so many possible paths allowed by the assumptions which are not considered in the
requirements, that our metric evaluated the coverage to 0. Given the way the coverage
is calculated, it must be the case that for every path in the assumption automaton there
was not a single path in the requirements automaton that would not violate some of the
edge labels of the assumptions. There is thus a considerable space for improvement.
The completeness improving process we are about to describe begins by generating a
set of candidate requirements among which those with the best resulting coverage are
selected. Table 1 summarises the process.
The first formula selected by the Algorithm 5 and leading to coverage of 9.1 per
cent was a simple ϕ1 =G(¬l): “The plane will never land”. Not particularly interesting
per se, nonetheless emphasising the fact that without this requirement, landing was
never required. The formula ϕ1 should thus be included among the forbidden behaviour.
Unlike ϕ1, the formula generated as second, F (¬b∧¬l) : “At some point the plane will
fly faster than 200 mph and will not be in the process of landing”, should be included
among the required behaviour. This formula points out that the required behaviour only
specifies what should happen after landing, unlike the assumptions, which also require
Table 1: Iterations of the completeness evaluation algorithm for the Aeroplane Control
System.
iteration suggested formula resulting system coverage of AA by An
1 ϕ1 = G(¬l) A1 = AR∨F∨ϕ1 9.1%
2 ϕ2 = F (¬b∧¬l) A2 = AR∨F∨ϕ1∨ϕ2 39.4%
3 ϕ3 = F (¬lU(a∨b)) A3 = AR∨F∨ϕ1∨ϕ2∨ϕ3 54.9%
flight. The third and final formula was F (¬lU(a∨b)): “Eventually it will hold that the
landing does not commence until either: (1) the plane is already on the ground or (2)
the speed decreased below 200 mph”. This last formula connects flight and landing and
its addition (among the required behaviour) entails coverage of 54.9 per cent.
There are two conclusion one can draw from this case study with respect to the com-
pleteness part of sanity checking. First, the requirements are generated automatically,
they are relevant and already formalised, thus amenable to further testing and verifi-
cation. Second, the new requirements can improve the insight of the engineer into the
problem. Both of these properties are valuable on their own, even though the method
did not finish with 100 per cent coverage. The method produced further, coverage-
improving formulae but even the best formulae only negligible improved the coverage
and thus the engineer decided to stop the process.
5.3 Alternative LTL to Bu¨chi Translations
Although the running time experiments were one of the priorities of the original pa-
per [2], their purpose was to investigate the effects of the proposed optimisations and
not the concrete time measurements. In other words, the subject of our investigation was
the asymptotic behaviour of the algorithms and how effectively does the algorithm scale
with the number of formulae in the average and in the extrema. Given our recent cooper-
ation with Honeywell and their interest in checking sanity of real-world, industry-level
sets of requirements, the actual running times became of particular interest as well.
Initial experiments revealed, however, that on larger sets of requirements and espe-
cially when more complex individual requirements were involved, the proposed san-
ity checking algorithms were unable to cope with the computational complexity. The
bottleneck proved to be the algorithm translating LTL formulae – conjunctions of the
original requirements – into Bu¨chi automata. The translator incorporated in DiVinE is
sufficiently fast on small formulae that commonly occur in software verification and
was never intended to be used with larger conjunctions. Thus, to enable checking sanity
of real-world sets of requirements, we have reimplemented the algorithms to employ
the state-of-the-art LTL to Bu¨chi translator SPOT [15] in a tool called Looney2. As the
case study summarising our cooperation with Honeywell in Section 5.4 shows, Looney
is able to process much larger formulae than the original tool and also to incorporate a
larger number of formulae into the sanity checking process.
2 As we are checking the sanity of requirements, the translator helps us to spot the looney ones.
The tool is available at http://anna.fi.muni.cz/˜xbauch/code.html#sanity.
The reimplementation of consistency was relatively straightforward since SPOT can
be interfaced via a shared library with an arbitrary C++ application. Even though this
enforced us to use the internal implementation of formulae from SPOT, which was dif-
ferent the one we had before, SPOT offers an adequate set of formulae-manipulating
operations that allowed the translation of our algorithms, without their needing to be
considerably modified. The reimplementation of the coverage algorithms was com-
plicated by the fact that the product of SPOT is a transition-based Bu¨chi automaton,
whereas the algorithm of Section 4 expects state-based automata: the difference is that
transitions rather than states are denoted as accepting.
This shift requires modification of the coverage evaluation, more precisely the def-
inition of Λ(A1,A2) of the coverage among automata. Before, the number m in the
denominator referred to the number of almost-simple paths of A1 that ended in an ac-
cepting vertex (state). We propose to redefine m as the number of almost-simple paths
that end in an accepting edge (transition). It is clear that the coverage reported by the
original and the new metrics would differ: first, because the automata are generated us-
ing different methods and may thus be structurally different and, second, because the
redefined metric considers different sets of almost-simple paths. With the alternative
definition of m one can easily incorporate translators that produce transition-based au-
tomata (though parsing these automata may still require some degree of modification
due to incompatibility of internal structures representing the automata).
Therefore, in order to reestablish admissibility of the new evaluation as an adequate
coverage metric, we have repeated the experiment with the aeroplane control system. As
was to be expected given the above argumentation, the concrete evaluation of individual
formulae differed from our original experiments. Specifically, the formula first gener-
ated (G(¬l)) was evaluated with coverage 12.9 per cent (instead of 9.1); the second
formula F (¬b∧¬l) with 35.0 (instead of 39.4); and the third formula F (¬lU(a∨b))
with 61.1 (instead of 54.9). Hence there are two observation to be made. First, even
though the coverage numbers differ for individual formulae, the same triple was pro-
duced by the modified algorithm. Moreover, the three formulae were produced in the
same order, thus the new metric behaves appropriately even when a new set of require-
ments is obtained as a disjunction of the old set with the generated coverage-improving
formula.
5.4 Industrial Evaluation
As a further extension to the original paper [2], we have evaluated our consistency and
redundancy checking method on a real-life sets of requirements obtained in cooper-
ation with Honeywell International. We did not extend this part of evaluation to the
completeness checking since that would require writing a new set of requirements with
separating the assumptions. The case study consisted of four Simulink models; each has
been associated with a set of formalised requirements in the form of LTL formulae. The
precise requirements are unfortunately confidential, but we provide statistics regarding
the complexity of the requirement documents. The formalisation of the requirements
that were originally given in natural language form has been done with the help of the
ForReq tool. The tool allows the user to write formal requirements with the help of the
specification patterns [16] and some of their extensions. See [3] for a detailed descrip-
tion of the tool.
Out of the four models, one (Lift) was a toy model used in Honeywell to evaluate the
capabilities of ForReq, three (VoterCore, AGS, pbit) were models of real-world avionics
subsystems. As the focus of this paper is model-less sanity checking, we ignored the
models themselves and only considered the formalised requirements. The results of our
experiments are summarised in Table 2.
The table reports that the largest collection of requirements consisted of 10 formu-
lae, which can hardly be considered as a demonstration of scaling to industrial level.
Even though some of the requirements were extremely complicated (with as many as
100 LTL operators), there is clearly a large space for improvement. It would certainly
be possible to use a different algorithm for performing a single consistency check, but
the number of these checks that needs to be performed is an independent issue left for
future work. In all four cases, the whole set of requirements was consistent. As for re-
dundancy, we have identified two cases where a formula was implied by another one.
This is shown in the redundancy result column. The number displayed in the mem(MB)
column represent the maximal (peak) amount of memory used.
The experiments, with the exception of the last one, were run on a dedicated Linux
workstation with Intel Xeon E5420 @ 2.5 GHz and 8 GB RAM. The last experiment
(pbit) was run on a Linux server with Intel X7560 @ 2.27 GHz and 450 GB RAM.
The last experiment was a consistency check only as the redundancy checking took too
much time. The reason for such great consumption of time (and memory) is that the
formulae in the pbit set of requirements are rather complex, some of them even using
precise specification of time. For more details about the time extension of LTL and its
translation to standard LTL, see [3].
Table 2: Results of consistency and redundancy checking on an industrial case study.
model no. of consistency redundancy
name formulae result time(s) mem(MB) result time(s) mem(MB)
VoterCore 3 OK 0.1 21.6 OK 0.4 22.4
AGS 5 OK 0.1 23.5 ϕ4⇒ ϕ2 0.7 23.6
Lift 10 OK 73.6 58.5 ϕ1⇒ ϕ5 9460.5 1474.5
pbit 10 OK 210879.0 22 649.0 — — —
6 Conclusion
This paper further expands the incorporation of formal methods into software devel-
opment. Aiming specifically at the requirements stage we propose a novel approach
to sanity checking of requirements formalised in LTL formulae. Our approach is com-
prehensive in scope integrating consistency, redundancy and completeness checking to
allow the user (or a requirements engineer) to produce a high quality set of requirements
easier. The expert knowledge of LTL is not a prerequisite for using the method, given
the existence of automated translator from English. On the other hand, there are certain
limitations with respect to the number of requirements checked concurrently, and larger
collections may require manually dividing into smaller sets.
Especially in the earliest stages of the requirements elicitation, when the engineers
have to work with highly incomplete, and often contradictory sets of requirements,
could our sanity checking framework be of great use. Other realisability checking tools
can also (and with better running times) be used on the nearly final set of requirements
but our process uniquely target these crucial early states. First, finding all inconsistent
subsets instead of merely one helps to more accurately pinpoint the source of inconsis-
tency, which may not have been elicited yet. Second, once working with a consistent
set, the requirements engineer gets further feedback from the redundancy analysis, with
every minimal redundancy witness pointing to a potential lack of understanding of the
system being designed. Finally, the semi-interactive coverage-improving generation of
new requirements attempts to partly automate the process of making the set of require-
ments as detailed as to prevent later development stages from misinterpreting a less
thoroughly covered aspect of the system. We demonstrate this potential application on
case studies of avionics systems.
The above described addition to the standard elicitation process may seem intrusive,
but the feedback we have gather from requirements engineers at Honeywell were mostly
positive. Especially given the tool support for each individual steps of the process –
pattern-based automatic translation from natural language requirements to LTL and the
subsequent fully- and semi-automated techniques for sanity checking – a fast adoption
of the techniques was observed. Many of the engineers reported a non-trivial initial
investment to assume the basics of LTL, but in most cases the resulting overall savings
in effort outweighed the initial adoption effort. After the first week, the overhead of
tool-supported formalisation into LTL was less than 5 minutes per requirement, while
the average time needed for corresponding stages of requirements elicitation decreased
by 18 per cent.
We have also accumulated a considerable amount of experience from employing the
sanity checking on real-world sets of requirements during our cooperation with Hon-
eywell International. Of particular importance was the realisation that the time require-
ments of our original implementation effectively prevented the use of sanity checking
on industrial scale. In order to ameliorate the poor timing results we have reimple-
mented the sanity checking algorithms using the state-of-the-art LTL to Bu¨chi transla-
tor SPOT, which accelerated the process by several orders on magnitude on larger sets
of formulae. Another important observation was that the concept of model-based vacu-
ity is desirable to be translated into the model-free environment more directly than as
redundancy. We thus extend the sanity checking process with the capacity to generate
vacuity witnesses (using the formally described theory of path-quantified formulae).
Finally, we summarise these and other observations in a case consisting of four sets of
requirements gathered during the development of industry-scale systems.
One direction of future research is the pattern-based candidate selection mentioned
above. Even though the selected candidates were relatively sensible in presented ex-
periments, using random formulae can produce useless results. Finally, experimental
evaluation on real-life requirements and subsequent incorporation into a toolchain fa-
cilitating model-based development are the long term goals of the presented research.
This paper also lacks formal definition of total coverage (which the proposed partial
coverage merely approximates). We intend to formulate an appropriate definition us-
ing uniform probability distribution: which would also allow to compute total coverage
without approximation and would not be biased by concrete LTL to BA translation.
That solution, however, is not very practical since the underlying automata translation
is doubly exponential.
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